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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
DAVID EARL HUTTO,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
______________________________)

NO. 45127
KOOTENAI COUNTY NO. CR 2016-20845

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
David Earl Hutto appeals from the district court’s judgment of conviction. He asserts
that the district court abused its discretion by imposing excessive sentences without adequately
considering the mitigating information in his case.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On October 22, 2016, Post Falls police responded to a missing person call. (Presentence
Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.1395.)1

1

The caller reported that she was worried because her

All citations to the PSI and its attachments refer to the 1582-page electronic document.
1

husband, William Kirk, had not returned home from work as expected. (PSI, p.1395.) She also
said she was concerned because she noticed that there were three $300 withdrawals made from
their bank account that day. (PSI, p.1395.) Shortly thereafter, law enforcement was notified that
Mr. Kirk’s truck had been found burned in Hayden. (PSI, p.1395.)
Three days later, law enforcement responded to a report that a body had been discovered.
(PSI, p.1395.) The body was later identified as that of Mr. Kirk. (PSI, p.1395.) He had been
shot eight times. (PSI, p.1395.) On October 28, 2016, Justin Booth went to the authorities and
provided details regarding his and Mr. Hutto’s involvement in the crime. (PSI, p.1395.) He said
they had abducted Mr. Kirk at gunpoint, shot him, and used his bank cards to get money from his
accounts.2 (PSI, p.1395.) He also explained that they subsequently burned Mr. Kirk’s truck.
(PSI, p.1395.)
Thereafter, Mr. Hutto was arrested and charged, by indictment, with one count of first
degree murder, one count of first degree kidnapping, one count of robbery, and one count of first
degree arson. (PSI, p.1395; R., pp.123-25.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Hutto agreed to
plead guilty to kidnapping and robbery and enter an Alford3 plea to the murder charge. (R.,
p.207; 2/1/17 Tr., p.3, Ls.16-23, p.9, L.15 – p.12, L.7.) In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss
the arson charge.4 (R., p.207.)
At the sentencing hearing, the State requested that the district court impose concurrent
fixed life sentences for all three charges. (Tr. 4/10/17, p.96, Ls.4-6.) Mr. Hutto’s counsel
requested that the district court impose a significant fixed term, with an indeterminate life
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As discussed below, Mr. Booth originally denied that he was at the location where Mr. Kirk
was shot but later recanted and admitted he was there. (4/10/17 Tr., p.70, Ls.8-20.)
3
See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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sentence, so that Mr. Hutto would have incentives to do well in prison and possibly testify at
Mr. Booth’s trial. (Tr. 4/10/17, p.110, Ls.11-20.) The district court imposed three concurrent
fixed life sentences. (Tr. 4/10/17, p.116, L.18 – p.117, L.3; R., pp.222-25.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed three concurrent fixed life sentences
upon Mr. Hutto following his pleas of guilty to first degree murder, first degree kidnapping, and
robbery?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Three Concurrent Fixed Life
Sentences Upon Mr. Hutto Following His Pleas Of Guilty To First Degree Murder, First Degree
Kidnapping, And Robbery
Mr. Hutto’s three concurrent fixed life sentences are excessive under any reasonable view
of the facts. When a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh
sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving
consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the
public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772 (Ct. App. 1982) (citation omitted).
Independent appellate sentencing examinations are based on an abuse of discretion
standard. State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho
382 (1978)). The Idaho Supreme Court has held that if a sentence imposed by a trial court is
within statutory limits, “‘the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse
of discretion.’” State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875 (2011) (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho
139, 148 (2008)). Appellate courts conduct a multi-tiered inquiry when an exercise of discretion
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The pretrial settlement offer also included the agreement that if Mr. Hutto withdrew his guilty
plea, the State would have 60 days in which to file a notice of intent to seek the death penalty.
(R., p.207.)
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is reviewed on appeal. The sequence of the “inquiry is first, whether the trial court correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; second, whether the trial court acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific
choices available to it; and finally, whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of
reason.” Id.
To prove that a sentence represents an abuse of discretion, a “defendant must show in
light of the governing criteria, [that the] sentence was excessive under any reasonable view of the
facts.” Id. (brackets in original) (citations omitted). The governing criteria, or objectives of
criminal punishment are: “(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the
public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing.” Id. at 876 (citing State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933 (2005)). “To impose a fixed
life sentence ‘requires a high degree of certainty that the perpetrator could never be safely
released back into society or that the nature of the offense requires that the individual spend the
rest of his life behind bars.’” Stevens, 146 Idaho at 149 (quoting State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667,
672 (1999)).

Therefore, a fixed life sentence should not be “a judicial hedge against

uncertainty.” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho
635, 638 (Ct. App. 1988)).
Mr. Hutto asserts that he is capable of rehabilitation and thus could be safely released
back into society in the future, and the nature of his crimes do not require such severe
punishment. At the sentencing hearing, the district court noted that this was Mr. Hutto’s first
violent offense, but it did not address the fact that Dr. Craig Beaver, Ph.D. — who conducted a
forensic neuropsychological examination of Mr. Hutto — ultimately concluded that Mr. Hutto
would be a “relatively low risk for violence in the future if he were to be given an opportunity to
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be released back out into the community.” (PSI, p.1580 (emphasis added).) Dr. Beaver reached
this conclusion in part because the violent offense in this case was an “outlier in comparison to
[Mr. Hutto’s] prior history,” and his interviews of Mr. Hutto’s family members did not reveal
that Mr. Hutto had previously been violent or aggressive towards others.

(PSI, p.1580.)

Additionally, Dr. Beaver wrote that “research in violence and recidivism is quite clear that the
risk of an individual engaging in violent or aggressive behaviors drops dramatically beginning in
the fourth decade of life and continues to drop thereafter.” (PSI, p.1580.) He noted that, because
Mr. Hutto would likely “be incarcerated for a significant period of time,” and he was already 44
years old, he would be a low risk for violence in the future. (PSI, p.1580.) While Dr. Beaver did
comment that, based on his prior history, Mr. Hutto “would be at high risk for engaging” in theftrelated crimes in the future (PSI, p.1580.), it is reasonable to surmise that if Mr. Hutto was
incarcerated for a significant period, the risk that he could or would engage in theft-related
crimes again would also be significantly reduced. In sum, Dr. Beaver’s report indicated that
Mr. Hutto could be safely released back into society in the future if he was properly medicated
and abstained from drug use as discussed in more detail below.
The district court, however, oversimplified the concept of rehabilitation for Mr. Hutto. It
noted that Mr. Hutto had twelve prior felonies and said only, “That’s a lot of opportunity to be
rehabilitated.” (4/10/17 Tr., p.115, Ls.1-3.) But Mr. Hutto has been struggling with serious
mental health and substance abuse issues for most of his life. (PSI, pp.1417-21, 1453-54, 157579.) The district court’s statement did not acknowledge how rehabilitation can be a much more
complex process when a person is struggling with these kinds of issues. Mr. Hutto has been
diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder, Schizo-affective Disorder, a major depressive disorder, and an
anxiety disorder. (PSI, pp.635, 964, 1417; 4/10/17 Tr., p.85, Ls.6-11.) While Mr. Hutto appears
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to have had some treatment for these issues, it is not clear that he has ever been able to engage in
targeted long-term therapy or whether alternative forms of treatment could be more effective for
him. Mr. Hutto reported that he had been “in and out of various mental health facilities” for
much of his life. (PSI, p.1575.) However, his records reveal that these visits were typically the
result of suicide attempts or withdrawal symptoms, and they only resulted in short stays after
which he was summarily discharged and prescribed medication.

For example, Mr. Hutto

checked himself in to a hospital for opioids withdrawal on June 30, 2005, and he was discharged
on July 1, 2005. (PSI, p.633.) In 2006, Mr. Hutto was admitted to the same hospital after
attempting suicide on August 29th. (PSI, p.633.) And even though he was diagnosed with
“Delirium, Depression, Opioids Withdrawal, Amphetamine Dependency, Opioids Dependency,
Psychosis and Back Pain,” he was discharged just a week later. (PSI, p.633.) The record reveals
that this pattern continued for years and that Mr. Hutto apparently attempted suicide at least four
times during that period. (PSI, pp.433-35; see also 4/10/17 Tr., p.83, L.11 – p.85, L.19.)
In June of 2016, Mr. Hutto was discharged from another behavioral health center, and he
told the staff he was moving out of the area. (PSI, p.635; 4/10/17 Tr., p.85, L.20 – p.86, L.1.)
And the investigator in this case — Mr. Burkhardt — explained that there was nothing in the
health center’s records indicating that it “made any effort to arrange out-patient services for
[Mr. Hutto] in Northern Idaho. Most importantly, there is no record of a provider referral in
Northern Idaho so that [Mr. Hutto] could continue his psych meds even when within the same
records [there] is ample evidence that when [Mr. Hutto] stops taking his meds, he suffers suicidal
and homicidal ideation, audio and visual hallucinations and has a propensity for violence.” (PSI,
pp.628, 635.) Mr. Burkhardt went on to state that the center could face sanctions for failing to
provide those services, and it had an obligation to arrange such services “particularly when
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evidence exists that failure to do so could result in a tragedy.”

(PSI, p.635.)

Finally,

Mr. Burkhardt wrote that Mr. Hutto was “likely un-medicated from June 13, 2016 until the date
these offenses occurred.” (PSI, p.635.)
Dr. Beaver commented that “Mr. Hutto needs to maintain his medications for treatment
of his bipolar disorder.” (PSI, p.1579.) He also wrote that Mr. Hutto has “historically been able
to be maintained on psychotropic medication,” and that he “must abstain from use of opioids or
other mind-altering drugs as well.” (PSI, p.1579.) He went on to explain that treatment for
Mr. Hutto’s issues “is readily available within both the Idaho Correctional System and is
available within the community.” (PSI, p.1579.) This information supports the notion that
Mr. Hutto could be safely released back into the community after spending a significant number
of years incarcerated and using that time to focus on a long-term plan to address and consistently
manage his mental health, substance abuse issues, and his severe pain problems as detailed
below. Thus, while Mr. Hutto posed some risk to reoffend in the near future, that risk was
dramatically lower if Mr. Hutto was properly medicated and able to abstain from drug use, and
would logically be even lower after an extended period of incarceration. Therefore, there was
not a high degree of certainty in this case that Mr. Hutto could never be safely released back into
society in the future. The district court failed to adequately consider this information and
therefore failed to reach its sentencing decision through an exercise of reason.
With respect to the nature of the crimes, there is no question that the crimes here were
serious and tragic. However, Mr. Hutto maintained throughout the case that Mr. Booth was the
person who shot Mr. Kirk. (PSI, p.526.) In his testimony before the grand jury, Mr. Booth
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stated that Mr. Hutto shot Mr. Kirk at close range. (PSI, p.49.)5 Mr. Booth apparently told law
enforcement the same story during his interview. (4/10/17 Tr., p.70, L.10 – p.71, L.1, 79, L.23 –
p.80, L.4.) But Mr. Burkhardt’s testimony revealed that Mr. Booth’s story was not supported by
the evidence because the autopsy report did not show that Mr. Kirk was shot at close range.
(4/10/17 Tr., p.79, L.23 – p.80, L.25.) Additionally, Mr. Burkhardt explained that Mr. Booth had
committed a previous crime after which he attempted to place the blame on his codefendant in
exchange for a deal. (4/10/17 Tr., p.62, L.14 – p.63, L.23.) In that case, Mr. Booth said that his
co-defendant stole the gun used in an armed robbery, but authorities later determined that
Mr. Booth had stolen the gun, held it during the robbery, and came up with the idea for the
robbery in the first place. (4/10/17 Tr., p.63, L.24 – p.64, L.21.) Mr. Burkhardt agreed that
Mr. Booth’s attempts to blame Mr. Hutto in this case were “very similar” to what he had done in
the prior case. (4/10/17 Tr., p.64, L.22 – p.65, L.2.)
Mr. Burkhardt also testified that he discovered during his investigation that Mr. Booth
had plans to make money by stealing a vehicle or committing home invasion robberies, and he
had discussed this with people other than Mr. Hutto. (4/10/17 Tr., p.66, L.7 – p.68, L.20.)
However, Mr. Booth originally told law enforcement “that there were no prior plans to commit
any crimes.” (4/10/17 Tr., p.69, Ls.17-20.) Instead, he said that kidnapping Mr. Kirk was
Mr. Hutto’s idea, and he originally denied that he was even at the location where the shooting
occurred but later changed his story. (4/10/17 Tr., p.70, Ls.3-18.) Mr. Burkhardt’s testimony
also exposed other inconsistencies in Mr. Booth’s statements. For example, Mr. Booth told law
enforcement that he was frightened of Mr. Hutto and went along with the kidnapping for that
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The grand jury transcript is part of the sealed 1582-page electronic document. Page 49 of that
document includes four pages of transcript from the grand jury proceeding. The specific citation
to the cited testimony is as follows: 11/9/16 Tr., p.101, L.11 – p.102, L.3.
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reason. (4/10/17 Tr., p.70, Ls.3-7.) However, Mr. Burkhardt said, “The only time that I found
any evidence that Mr. Booth was afraid of Mr. Hutto was when he went to law enforcement after
this crime occurred.” (4/10/17 Tr., p.76, Ls.7-21.) Finally, in commenting on Mr. Hutto’s
description of the events, Mr. Burkhardt noted that Mr. Hutto told law enforcement that he
thought the plan on the day of the crimes was to steal Mr. Kirk’s truck and bank cards and then
drop Mr. Kirk in the woods, so he would have to walk out, but Mr. Booth came up with the idea
to kill Mr. Kirk because Mr. Kirk had seen his face. (4/10/17 Tr., p.73, L.11 – p.74, L.21.)
Therefore, in sum, the investigator’s testimony indicated that Mr. Hutto’s role in these crimes
was likely not as significant as Mr. Booth’s and not so egregious as to require that he spend the
rest of his life incarcerated. The district court failed to adequately consider this information
when it imposed the sentences upon Mr. Hutto.
The district court also failed to adequately consider the mitigating information in this
case. In addition to the fact that Mr. Hutto had never been convicted of a violent crime prior to
this case, it appears that Mr. Hutto’s severe mental health problems and substance abuse issues
were likely due in part to his tragic and violent childhood. As the PSI writer aptly put it,
“Mr. Hutto described a childhood fraught with violence, instability, and poverty.” (PSI, p.1425.)
Mr. Hutto said he never met his father as a child because his father left the family before
Mr. Hutto was six months old. (PSI, p.1412.) Mr. Hutto then lost his mother in a car accident
when he was only eight years old.6

(PSI, p.1412.)

As a result, he had to live with his

grandmother and his step-grandfather, Bill Day. (PSI, p.1412.) Mr. Hutto said Mr. Day was an
extremely violent man; he explained that he was “beaten almost every day by Mr. Day and

6

The PSI shows that this event likely precipitated Mr. Hutto’s mental illness; he spent time in a
psychiatric hospital after his mother passed away. (PSI, p.1575.)
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witnessed other domestic violence incidents against his grandmother, one of them resulting in
her sustaining two broken arms.” (PSI, p.1413.) Mr. Hutto stated that this went on for five years
until he finally left home after a violent argument with Mr. Day.

(PSI, pp.1413, 1425.)

Mr. Hutto said that from that point on, he lived with friends or other family members until he
was able to finish school. (PSI, p.1413.) A defendant’s abusive childhood is a long-recognized
mitigating factor. See State v. Gonzales, 123 Idaho 92, 93-94 (Ct. App. 1993)
A defendant’s expressions of remorse should also be considered as mitigating
information. State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that some leniency
was required, in part, because the defendant expressed “remorse for his conduct”). Mr. Hutto
expressed remorse over his crimes. In his statement to the court, he wrote, “It is with great regret
and remorse that I look back on the events of 10-22-2016. Those events have changed so many
lives for the worse. Not just my life and that of the victim but also that of the victim’s family
and friends. Nothing I can say, nothing I can do can change the outcome of that night, but I will
pay for my part in those events for the rest of my life . . . .” (PSI, p.1422.)
Additionally, a defendant’s physical health and substance abuse problems should also be
considered as mitigating information. State v. James, 112 Idaho 239, 243-44 (Ct. App. 1986)
(holding that the health problems of the defendant are a factor for the district court to consider in
evaluating a motion for a sentence reduction); State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). Mr. Hutto
suffers from serious health problems. He has epileptic seizures, and he injured his back in a
work accident in 1994; he ultimately had to have lumbar fusion in 2004.

(PSI, p.1418.)

Mr. Hutto’s chronic and severe back pain was referenced at multiple places in the record and
clearly contributed to his anxiety, depression, and opioid addiction. (See e.g. PSI, pp.633, 634,
679, 907.) In fact, when interviewed for this case, his ex-wife said that he was a “great husband
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and father” until he became addicted to opioids while recovering from surgery. (PSI, p.630.)
Further, Mr. Hutto has been diagnosed with the following substance abuse disorders: a severe
opioid use disorder; a stimulant use disorder – amphetamine type; a cannabis use disorder; a
sedative, hypnotic, or anxiolytic disorder; and a stimulant use disorder – cocaine type. (PSI,
pp.1429-34.)
Finally, it is clear that Mr. Hutto was suffering from serious mental health problems at
the time of these offenses. As Dr. Beaver and Mr. Burkhardt noted, he had not taken his
medications in several months.

(PSI, pp.635, 1579; 4/10/17 Tr., p.85, L.20 – p.86, L.1.)

Dr. Beaver wrote that Mr. Hutto’s mental health “would have negatively impacted his judgment
in considering the behaviors in which he was involved. This also potentially would make him
more easily influenced by individuals around him, such as the codefendant.” (PSI, p.1579.)
Mr. Burkhardt also testified that Mr. Hutto was suffering from mental health problems when he
was first interviewed by the authorities. (4/10/17 Tr., p.86, Ls.2-11.) Indeed, Mr. Hutto’s
comments at that interview showed he was likely delusional at that point as he was telling law
enforcement he used to work as a sniper and believed that members of Mr. Kirk’s family were on
a bus with him. (4/10/17 Tr., p.86, L.17 – p.87, L.16.) When a defendant’s “mental health
condition is a significant factor,” as it surely was here, I.C. § 19-2523(1)(f) requires the district
court to consider — “The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law at the time of the offense charged” when
making its sentencing decision. The district court mentioned that Mr. Hutto had mental health
problems, but there is no indication that it specifically considered how Mr. Hutto’s mental health
affected his ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct on the day these offenses
occurred.
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The district court did not adequately consider the mitigating information in this case, the
evidence showing that Mr. Hutto could one day be safely released back into society, and the
evidence indicating that Mr. Hutto’s role in these crimes was not as significant as Mr. Booth’s.
This information shows that this case does not call for fixed life sentences. Therefore, the
district court failed to act consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it, and failed to reach its sentencing decision through an exercise of reason. As such,
it abused its discretion when it imposed three concurrent fixed life sentences in this case.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Hutto respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentences as it deems
appropriate.
DATED this 23rd day of April, 2018.

___________/s/______________
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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